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I. INTRODUCTION  
Something curious is happening in global copyright law. At the 
end of the twentieth century, the Fair Use Doctrine was an 
idiosyncratic feature of American law.1  This doctrine, that permits 
 
*Patrick R. Goold, Qualcomm Postdoctoral Fellow in Private Law and IP, Harvard 
Law School. For their comments on this project, the author would like to thank: 
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copying of copyrighted works without the owner’s permission for 
certain “fair” uses, appeared on the statue books of no nation other 
than the U.S.A.2  But today the landscape of global copyright is 
changing.3 Since 2000, Israel,4  South Korea,5 the Philippines,6 Sri 
Lanka,7 and more, have adopted this erstwhile American doctrine. 
Canada modified its existing Fair Dealing defense to resemble Fair 
Use.8 Australia9 and Ireland10  may be poised to follow suit after law 
reform commissions recommended their respective legislatures adopt 
Fair Use to facilitate growth in the “digital economy.” The United 
Kingdom, finding Fair Use to be helpful for ensuring flexibility in 
copyright doctrine, would perhaps have adopted the defense if it 
were not for the lingering concern that doing so might breach 
European copyright norms.11 Once viewed as a quirk of U.S. law, the 
 
Oren Bracha, Graeme Dinwoodie, Sean Flynn, Janet Freilich, Henning Grosse 
Ruse-Khan, Dmitry Karshtedt, Martin Senftleben, Peter Yu, the participants of the 
American University, Washington College of Law Symposium on Globalizing Fair 
Use, and the editors of the American University International Law Review. 
 1. Peter Decherney, Fair Use Goes Global, 31 CRITICAL STUD. IN MEDIA 
COMM. 146, 146 (2014) (stating that “[f]or 150 years, fair use was a solely 
American doctrine.”). 
 2. See 17 U.S.C. §107 (2017). 
 3. See Richard J. Peltz, Global Warming Trend? The Creeping Indulgence of 
Fair Use in International Copyright Law?, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 267, 267-68 
(2009) (stating that “[t]he concept has escaped its disfavored status as a U.S. 
peculiarity and achieved some traction in international legal circles.”). 
 4. Copyright Act, 2007-19 (Isr.) [hereinafter Israel Copyright Act]. 
 5. [Copyright Act], Act. No. 432, 2011, amended by Act. No. 12137, 35ter (S. 
Kor.) [hereinafter South Korean Copyright Act]. 
 6. An Act Prescribing the Intellectual Property Code and Establishing the 
Intellectual Property Office, Providing for Its Powers and Functions, and for Other 
Purposes, Rep. Act. No. 8293, §185 (1998) (Phil.) [hereinafter Philippines 
Intellectual Property Code]. 
 7. Intellectual Property Act §12 (Act No. 36 of 2003) (Sri Lanka) [hereinafter 
Sri Lanka Intellectual Property Act]. 
 8. Michael Geist, Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from Fair 
Dealing to Fair Use, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT 
OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 157-186 
(Michael Geist ed., 2013). 
 9. Australian Law Reform Commission, Copyright and the Digital Economy, 
ALRC Report 122, November 2013, paras 11.77-11.84. 
 10. COPYRIGHT REV. COMM., COPYRIGHT AND INNOVATION, A CONSULTATION 
PAPER 89 (2012) (Ir.), http://www.djei.ie/science/ipr/crc_consultation_paper.pdf. 
 11. See IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH 44-46 (2011) (discussing the benefits and 
challenges associated with adopting Fair Use in the UK). 
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Fair Use doctrine now presents an opportunity for many countries to 
promote efficient and fair copyright law in the Information Age. The 
question on the minds of lawmakers is: Does the Fair Use doctrine 
comply with the requirements of international copyright law? 
The Fair Use doctrine’s legitimacy is determined by international 
copyright law’s “Three-Step Test,” but the interpretation of this 
provision is viciously contested. 12 International copyright law 
permits states to enact copyright exceptions and limitations only in 
“certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author.”13 Broadly, this provision is subject 
to two diverging interpretations: the so-called “Traditional” and 
“Balanced” Interpretations.14  The Traditional Interpretation claims 
the purpose of international copyright law is to increase worldwide 
copyright standards and to ensure copyright owners a high level of 
legal protection.15  The Three-Step Test provision is therefore 
interpreted restrictively and thus narrows down the array of 
exceptions and limitations that a state may enact.16 Under this 
interpretation, the Fair Use doctrine exempts too much copying and 
is too unpredictable to pass the Test.17 By contrast, the Balanced 
Interpretation emphasizes that international copyright law’s purpose 
is to appropriately balance the interests of copyright owners and 
wider society.18  Creators require some copyright protection to ensure  
a fair reward for their labor and to preserve their creative incentives.  
However, the interests of copyright owners must be balanced against 
the interest of wider society in accessing copyrighted material. The 
goal of international copyright law is, therefore, to guarantee that 
states provide a minimum level of copyright protection, while 
simultaneously permitting states to enact exceptions and limitations 
that are in the broader social interest. The Three-Step Test is the 
 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 
9(2), Sept. 9, 1886, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; see also 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 13, Jan. 1, 
1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part II.B. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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fulcrum of this balancing project; and the Fair Use doctrine is 
generally seen to pass the Balanced Interpretation of the Test.19  
National lawmakers, therefore, cite the Balanced Interpretation as 
evidence that enacting Fair Use will not breach international 
obligations. 
This Essay analyzes the Balanced Interpretation of the Three-Step 
Test.  Advocates of the Balanced Interpretation make a bold 
doctrinal argument: When the Three-Step Test is “correctly” 
interpreted, the Balanced Interpretation is the legitimate description 
of states’ legal obligations.20 Supporters of the Traditional 
Interpretation criticize this claim. Traditionalists argue that the 
Balanced Interpretation cannot be the right interpretation of the 
Three-Step Test because it contradicts an important WTO panel 
 
 19. Id. 
 20.  Some commentators have characterized this argument as a “Legal Realist” 
argument, see e.g. Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, When Copyright Law 
and Science Collide: Empowering Digitally Integrated Research Methods on a 
Global Scale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1362, 1455 (2012) (praising the Balanced 
Interpretation for introducing “a healthy dose of legal realism into the traditional 
positivism surrounding European copyright jurisprudence”). If by “realism” such 
commentators simply mean that the authors of the Balanced Interpretation 
recognize a connection between law and politics, then there is no serious problem 
in calling the Balanced Interpretation’s argument “realist.” However, labeling this 
argument as a Realist argument would conflict somewhat with how the “Realism” 
and “Formalism” terms typically are used in legal philosophy literature. In this 
literature, “Realism” and “Formalism” are theories of adjudication. Formalism 
stands for the belief that laws can be applied by a judge to determine a uniquely 
correct answer to a question of law; Realism by contrast argues that laws are 
indeterminate and thus to decide questions of law, judges necessarily need recourse 
to non-legal concerns. See e.g. HLA HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-154 (2012, 
3d ed); Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV.  1138, 
1144-1153 (1999).  If we adopt this terminology, then the arguments advanced by 
many supporters of the Balanced Interpretation are Formalist: the argument they 
offer is that there is a correct legal interpretation of the Three-Step Test, i.e. the 
Balanced Interpretation, and that those adopting an alternative interpretation 
(including WTO panels), such as the more traditionalist interpretation, are making 
some form of legal error. Furthermore, as discussed below, infra Part II.C., this 
position is open to the usual criticism leveled against Formalist claims, i.e. that 
such arguments are merely masks for hidden normative judgments. By contrast, a 
“Realist” argument would be to say the Three-Step Test has no determinate 
meaning, and that interpreting the test requires the interpreter to have recourse to 
some form of extra-legal considerations (such as normative value). It is the 
Formalist claim made on behalf of the Balanced Interpretation that this Essay 
examines. 
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report – one of the few authorities to interpret the Three-Step Test’s 
meaning – and is inconsistent with some of the intentions of the 
international copyright lawmakers who originally drafted the 
provision.21 Traditionalists argue that the Balanced Interpretation is 
therefore not really an interpretation at all, but a disguised normative 
argument and reform proposal. The question, therefore, is: Can the 
doctrinal claim made in support of the Balanced Interpretation be 
defended against this critique? Note, the question is not which 
interpretation is simply the most normatively attractive? Nor is the 
question, given the vagueness and ambiguity of the Three-Step 
Test’s wording, which interpretation ought judges or national 
policymakers, in their discretion, to adopt? Instead, this Essay takes 
seriously the claim, made by the Balanced Interpretation’s 
supporters, that the Balanced Interpretation is the correct legal 
interpretation of the Three-Step Test, and asks whether this can be 
defended in light of the traditionalist criticism. 
This Essay argues that in order to defend the Balanced 
Interpretation’s doctrinal claim, then one must adopt some version 
of, what this Essay calls, the “Interpretive Argument.”22 Broadly, 
jurists divide into three schools on the issue of treaty interpretation: 
textualist, intentionalist, and teleological.23 It is hard to defend the 
doctrinal claims made on behalf of the Balanced Interpretation on the 
grounds of textualism or intentionalism: the ordinary meaning of the 
treaty wording is too ambiguous to provide conclusive support for 
the Balanced Interpretation; and arguably the drafters of the original 
Three-Step Test intended a more restrictive provision than that 
envisioned by the Balanced Interpretation. If the Balanced 
Interpretation is to be proclaimed the correct interpretation, then it 
must rest on a more teleological approach to treaty interpretation 
which favors the provision’s “purpose” over text and intent.24  
Within the realm of teleological approaches to legal interpretation, 
strongest support for the Balanced Interpretation comes from a 
teleological approach found more commonly at the national level: 
 
 21. See infra Part II.C. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See infra Part III.A. 
 24. Id. 
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Legal Interpretivism.25 Legal Interpretivism – developed primarily by 
Ronald Dworkin – argues that law is not merely a social construct, 
but is a partly moral enterprise. Therefore, when interpreting the 
content of law on a given issue (whether that be construing a line of 
cases, interpreting a statute, or indeed reading a treaty provision), 
one must take into account the most normatively defensible purpose 
justifying the relevant area of law. Legal interpretation is thus a 
creative process whereby lawyers aim to produce a “constructive 
interpretation” guided by underlying normative principles. 26 The 
goal of such a creative process is ultimately to find the interpretation 
which shows the provision in its “best light.” 27   
When viewed through an Interpretivist lens, the doctrinal claim 
made by supporters of the Balanced Interpretation is at its most 
persuasive.28 The most normatively defensible purpose of 
international copyright law is that such regulation harmonizes 
national copyright standards in a way that will balance the rights of 
owners and users in order to maximize society’s interests. From the 
standpoint of Legal Interpretivism, this justification must therefore 
be used as the guiding light when interpreting the Three-Step Test, 
and ambiguities in the text must be resolved in a way that favors this 
purpose. On Interpretivist grounds therefore, the Balanced 
Interpretation is arguably the correct interpretation of the Three-Step 
Test, because only this interpretation gives effect to the most 
normatively defensible purposes of international copyright law, and 
thus presents the Test in its “best light.” 
The significance of the Interpretive Argument is three-fold. First, 
if persuasive, it supports the claim that the Balanced Interpretation is 
the correct legal interpretation of the Three- Step Test. Second, the 
Interpretative Argument enables a rational response to some 
traditionalist criticisms.29 For example, in response to the 
traditionalist claim that the Balanced Interpretation is really a 
disguised normative reform proposal, supporters of the Balanced 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45-87 (1986). 
 27. Id. at 90 (stating that theories of law “try to show legal practice as a whole 
in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and 
the best justification of that practice.”). 
 28. See infra Part III.B. 
 29. Id. 
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Interpretation could counter argue that they are not proposing legal 
reform, but instead re-aligning the Test’s interpretation to conform to 
the normative values justifying international copyright law as a 
whole. In response to the traditionalist argument that the Balanced 
Interpretation does not fit some aspects of the WTO panel report, or 
the intentions of some of the drafters, supporters of the Balanced 
Interpretation could counter-argue that the right interpretation need 
not be consistent with all aspects of the Test’s history in order to be, 
overall, the interpretation most capable of showing the Test in its 
“best light.” And third, by introducing the Interpretive Argument, 
this Essay clarifies and highlights the methodological and 
jurisprudential commitments of the supporters of this interpretation.30 
Note, however, what is not riding on the strength of the 
Interpretive Argument. If one finds the Interpretive Argument 
unpersuasive, and thus presumably that the Balanced Interpretation’s 
doctrinal claim fails, then one could still legitimately claim either: (i) 
that the Balanced Interpretation presents  the most normatively 
attractive vision for the Three-Step Test and that states have the 
freedom to alter international copyright norms to adopt this new rule 
(the Normative Argument); or (ii)  that, given the Three-Step Test’s 
wording and history are indeterminate, the Balanced Interpretation is 
one of many legitimate doctrinal interpretations from which judges 
and national policy makers could, in their discretion, choose to adopt 
as they prefer (the Discretion Argument).31 
The Essay is in three parts: Part II summarizes the debate 
regarding the interpretation of the Three-Step Test. It introduces the 
so-called “Traditional” and “Balanced” Interpretations, and explains 
how they apply to the question of Fair Use.  This Essay adopts the 
terms “Traditional” and “Balanced” because these terms reflect how 
supporters perceive these interpretations. The “Traditional” 
Interpretation, for example, is so-named here, not because it is 
necessarily more traditional, but because its advocates often claim 
that it is. Part III introduces the “Interpretive Argument” to support 
the Balanced Interpretation. Finally, Part IV considers challenges to 
the Interpretive Argument, and briefly develops the alternative 
Normative Argument  and Discretion Argument. 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
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II. TRADITIONAL VERSUS BALANCED 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE THREE-STEP TEST 
May a state adopt a Fair Use doctrine without breaching 
international copyright obligations? The answer depends on whether 
the Fair Use doctrine passes the “Three-Step Test.”  Sadly, there is 
little consensus on what the Three-Step Test requires. Part I of this 
Essay summarizes the so-called “Traditional” and “Balanced” 
Interpretations of the Three-Step Test and their respective answers 
on the question of Fair Use’s legitimacy. Part I then describes an 
important criticism of the Balanced Interpretation. 
A.  DOES FAIR USE PASS THE THREE-STEP TEST? 
The “Three-Step Test” determines what copyright exceptions and 
limitations states may enact.32 The Berne Convention on Literary and 
Artistic Works, first signed in 1886, requires all member states to 
give authors an exclusive legal right to reproduce their expressive 
works.33 In 1967, the parties revised the Convention to include a 
provision determining what exceptions and limitations to the authors’ 
reproduction right would be permitted.34  Article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention, now known as the Three-Step Test, states: 
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit 
the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such 
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work, and 
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.35 
The international community further embedded the Three-Step 
Test into international copyright law in the 1990s. To join the World 
Trade Organization, states are required to ratify the 1994 Agreement 
 
 32. See JANE GINSBURG & SAM RICKETSON, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 759-783 (2010) 
(providing commentary on Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention). 
 33. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 9. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 9(2). 
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on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).36  Article 
13 of TRIPS states that member states shall “confine limitations . . . 
[to]exclusive rights . . . [and] certain special cases which do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.”37 
Accordingly, the Three-Step Test determines not only how states 
may limit an author’s right of reproduction, but rather restricts how 
states may limit any authorial right, including rights to distribute, 
adapt, perform, or display a work.  Finally, in 1996, the Three-Step 
Test was also included in the World Intellectual Property 
Organization’s “Internet Treaties,” designed to regulate copyright in 
the digital age. 38 
The Fair Use Doctrine is a limit to copyright protection.39 Fair Use 
permits the copying of an expressive work without the copyright 
owner’s consent provided that the copying and subsequent use of the 
expressive work is “fair.” 40  What qualifies as a “fair” use is not 
precisely defined. Rather the concept of “fair use” is left deliberately 
vague.41 Through the twentieth-century only the U.S.A. adopted this 
unique copyright limitation.42 The Fair Use doctrine originated in the 
1841 case of Folsom v Marsh,43 and was later codified in §107 of the 
U.S. Copyright Act 1976.44  This section provides some illustrative 
examples of uses that may be “fair,” including research, teaching, 
criticism, and related uses.45  It also provides a non-exhaustive list of 
 
 36. TRIPS, supra note 13. 
 37. Id. 
 38. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, art 10., Dec. 
20, 1996, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty]. ; see also WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 16, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 
203 [hereinafter WPPT]. 
 39. 17 U.S.C. §107. 
 40. Id. 
 41. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976) (“there is no disposition to freeze the 
doctrine in the statute”); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 584 (1994) (“Congress resisted attempts to narrow the ambit of this traditional 
enquiry by adopting categories of presumptively fair use, and it urged courts to 
preserve the breadth of their traditionally ample view of the universe of relevant 
evidence.”). 
 42. Decherney, supra note 1, at 146 (“[f]or 150 years, fair use was a solely 
American doctrine.”). 
 43. 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
 44. 17 U.S.C. §107. 
 45. Id. 
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factors that judges ought to consider when determining whether a use 
is fair: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the 
copyrighted work, the amount of expression copied, and the effect of 
the copying upon the market or value for the original work.46  By 
leaving the “fairness” concept vague, the law retains flexibility to 
keep pace with technological change. Under the doctrine, judges can 
hold new, technology-enabled uses to be non-infringing “fair” uses, 
even though Congress did not envision these uses when it passed the 
1976 Copyright Act. Since the codification, judges have held many 
new uses to be fair, including time-shifting of television programs,47 
caching of Internet websites by search engines,48 creating digital 
libraries for limited public access,49 and reverse engineering of 
computer code,50 to give just a few examples.51 
Today many states are adopting this erstwhile American doctrine. 
Historically, civil law countries allowed the use of copyrighted 
material without permission only in a small number of precisely 
defined situations.52 Section VI of the German Copyright Act, for 
example, lists 18 permitted “free uses,”53 such as the making of 
“transient or incidental” copies as part of a “technical process”54 and 
copying “limited parts of works” on a “small scale” for use by 
schools on a non-commercial basis.55  These limits to copyright are 
more precise than the Fair Use approach but also less flexible.  
Lacking a specific statutory provision, judges faced with new, 
technologically-enabled uses cannot easily hold such use to be non-
infringing.56  Other common law countries adopt a mid-way “Fair 
Dealing” solution.57 Fair Dealing countries allow users to copy a 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 418 (1984). 
 48. Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1107 (D. Nev. 2006). 
 49. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 229 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 50. Sega Enterprise Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 51. For greater discussion, see Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2619 (2009). 
 52. See Samuel Ricketson, WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment, 67-73 SCCR/9/7 (Apr. 
5, 2003) (comparing “closed list” and other approaches to copyright exceptions). 
 53. Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG][Copyright Act], § 6 (Ger.). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at § 44a. 
 56. Id. at § 46. 
 57. LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 223 
2017] THE INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT 197 
work without permission provided the copying is in aid of some 
exclusive, statutorily defined purposes.58 For example, the U.K. 
allows “fair dealing” with copyrighted works for purposes of non-
commercial research, study, criticism, review, or news reporting.59 
The Fair Dealing approach is thus more limited than the Fair Use 
approach because the number of uses that may be permitted is 
limited to a small class of purposes, although judges have flexibility 
to decide what constitutes a “fair” amount of copying for those 
purposes.60 Still, in the current information age, many countries have 
perceived the need for greater flexibility in their domestic copyright 
law. To ensure their law keeps pace with technological change, 
countries such as Israel,61 South Korea,62 and Philippines63 have 
adopted Fair Use doctrines, while others like Australia64 and Ireland65 
have recommended its adoption. Other jurisdictions, such as the 
U.K.66 and the E.U.,67 are considering Fair Use but have, so far, only 
recommended trying to recreate the flexibility of Fair Use within 
their existing legal frameworks.68 
 
(2014); see also Giuseppina D’Agostino, Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative 
Copyright Analysis of Canada’s Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair 
Use, 53 MCGILL L.J. 309, 312-14 (2008).  
 58. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act ¶ 29-30 (1988) (Eng.). 
 59. Id. 
 60. BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 57, at 224 (stating that “[t]he restricted 
approach adopted in the United Kingdom should be contrasted with US copyright 
law, which has a general defense of fair use such that if the court is satisfied that 
the use is fair, then there will be no infringement.”); see also JONATHAN BAND & 
JONATHAN GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK (2013), 
http://infojustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/band-and-gerafi-2013.pdf 
(extrapolating on the evolution of fair use statutes). 
 61. Israel Copyright Act § 19. 
 62. South Korean Copyright Act § 35ter. 
 63. Philippines Intellectual Property Code § 185 (providing fair use protections 
for comment, criticism, reporting, and teaching based on copyrighted works). 
 64. See Copyright and the Digital Economy, ALRC Report 122, paras 11.77-
11.84 (highlighting the Australian Law Reform Commission’s endorsement of fair 
use protections for use of copyright material for non-expressive purposes). 
 65. See COPYRIGHT REV. COMM., supra note 10, at 89 (discussing whether a 
US-style Fair Use doctrine would be appropriate for Ireland). 
 66. See HARGREAVES, supra note 11, at 45-46. 
 67. P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & MARTIN R.F. SENFTLEBEN, FAIR USE IN EUROPE: 
IN SEARCH OF FLEXIBILITIES 2-4 (2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2013239. 
 68. See HARGREAVES, supra note 11, at 5 (arguing that adopting Fair Use 
would be unfeasible in the U.K. and that the U.K. can achieve many of these 
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Therefore, the question is: Does the Fair Use doctrine pass the 
Three-Step Test?  May a country enact a U.S. style Fair Use doctrine 
consistent with its obligation to allow copyright exceptions only in 
“certain special cases?” Lawmakers have yet to clearly articulate an 
answer to this question. In 1967, the U.S. was not party to the Berne 
Convention.  While the U.S. was present at the Revision Conference, 
very few references are made in the official documents to “Fair Use,”  
none of which explain what the drafters thought regarding the 
legality of the doctrine under the new standard.69 The de-restricted 
documents from the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations leading to 
TRIPS similarly contain only scattered references to the doctrine.70 
When the U.S. joined the Berne Convention in 1989, it was certainly 
not forced to abandon the Fair Use doctrine,71 but nor was the 
doctrine explicitly endorsed as passing the Test. Later in 1996, when 
the parties ratified TRIPS, the European Community (“E.C.”), 
Australia, and New Zealand each questioned the U.S. on the 
legitimacy of Fair Use doctrine under the Three-Step Test.72 The U.S. 
 
benefits under existing E.U. law); HUGENHOLTZ & SENFTLEBEN, supra note 67, at 
29. 
 69. See e.g. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, RECORDS OF 
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONFERENCE OF STOCKHOLM 860, 978 (1967) 
[hereinafter WIPO Stockholm Records]. (highlighting when discussion of the 
reproduction of copyrighted materials for news reporting hinted at Fair Use). 
 70. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting of Negotiating Group 12-
14 September 1988, GATT Doc. MTN.GNC/NG11/9, 8 (Oct. 13, 1988) 
[hereinafter Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 1]; see also 
Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Existence, Scope and Form of Generally 
Internationally Accepted and Applied Standards/Norms for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/24, 23 (May 5, 1988) 
[hereinafter Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 2] 
(explaining  commonly applied national provisions within copyright law). 
 71. The U.S. joined the Berne Convention by enacting the Berne Convention 
Implementation Act Pub.L. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853. For discussion of the US 
accession to the Berne Convention and Fair Use, see Ruth Okediji, Toward an 
International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 105 (2000) 
(noting that the United States did not change this aspect of domestic law, although 
other parts of domestic law were changed). 
 72. See, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Review of Legislation on Copyright and Related Rights United States, 
WTO Doc. IP/Q/USA/1 at 2, 4, 18 (Oct. 30, 1996); See generally Okediji, supra 
note 71, at 116 (discussing the questions presented to the USA regarding Fair Use 
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delegates defended Fair Use arguing that it embodied “essentially the 
same goals as Article 13 of TRIPS”73 and is “applied and interpreted 
in a way entirely congruent with the standards set forth in that 
Article.”74 Ultimately, however, the European Community, Australia, 
and New Zealand dropped the issue, and it never reached a tribunal 
or court. Accordingly, the answer today still depends largely on how 
one interprets the Three-Step Test.  This interpretation remains hotly 
contested. 
B.  TWO ANSWERS: THE “TRADITIONAL” AND “BALANCED” 
INTERPRETATIONS 
Two interpretations of the Three-Step Test exist: the so-called 
“Traditional” and “Balanced” Interpretations.  Those who adopt the 
Traditional Interpretation typically find Fair Use fails to pass the 
Three-Step Test; those who adopt the Balanced Interpretation reach 
the opposite conclusion. 
1. The Traditional Interpretation 
According to the Traditional Interpretation, the purpose of the 
Berne Convention Revision was to increase worldwide copyright 
standards,  and to ensure authors enjoy a high level of legal 
protection.  As stated in the preparatory documents created by The 
United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property (BIRPI), the purpose of the Stockholm Revision was “the 
enlargement of the protection granted to authors by the creation of 
new rights or by the extension of rights which are already 
recognized.”75 The enlargement goal was executed by the 
introduction of Article 9 and the right of reproduction. According to 
BIRPI, “it was obvious that all forms of exploiting a work which 
had, or were likely to acquire, considerable economic or practical 
importance must in principle be reserved to the authors and 
“exceptions that might restrict the possibilities open to authors in 
 
and article 13 TRIPS). 
 73. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
supra note 72, at 4; Okediji, supra note 71, at 117. 
 74. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra 
note 72, at 4. 
 75. WIPO Stockholm Records, supra note 69, at 80. 
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these respects were unacceptable.”76 Subsequently, this high-
protectionist goal has been criticized. Ruth Okediji, for example, 
criticizes the progressive “ratcheting up” of copyright protections in 
each round of Berne Revisions,77 and the developed nation desire to 
ensure “near absolute control over reproduction of the protected 
works.”78 
Those who favor the so-called Traditional Interpretation do not 
deny that exceptions and limitations play an important role in 
international copyright law; however, given the overall purpose of 
increasing worldwide copyright standards, supporters of this 
interpretation take a conservative stance towards permissible 
limitations.  The BIRPI study, after deciding that exceptions are 
generally unacceptable, stated that “it should not be forgotten that 
domestic laws already contained a series of exceptions in favor of 
various public and cultural interests and that it would be vain to 
suppose that countries would be ready at this stage to abolish these 
exceptions to any appreciable extent.”79 Rather than abolish such 
exceptions, the Three-Step Test formula ensures that pre-existing 
exceptions and limitations remained unscathed.80  But while the 
Three-Step Test clearly permits Union members’ pre-existing 
exceptions, the Three-Step Test views new exceptions suspiciously. 
Scholars have occasionally argued that, consistent with the “strong 
level of protection that the Berne Convention creates, the three 
requirements of article 9(2) are cumulatively interpreted to yield the 
most narrow effect”81 and that “[b]road exceptions are not 
sanctioned.”82 To accomplish this, each “step” of the Three-Step Test 
 
 76. Id. at 111. 
 77. Okediji, supra note 71, at 105. See also Okediji, supra note 71, at 106 (“By 
the time of the last substantive Berne Convention revision, the Stockholm 
Conference of 1967, the scope of exceptions to authors’ rights had noticeably 
contracted.”). Indeed the “fundamental design objective” of the Berne Convention 
changed through revisions from a “pan-universal, minimalist treaty” to “one which 
provided significant substantive provisions for the protection of copyright on a 
multilateral basis,” Id. at 109. This trend was arguably even more noticeable in 
TRIPS. Arguably one of the “cardinal objectives” of TRIPS was to “extend strong 
intellectual property rules to the rest of the world” Id. at 81. 
 78. Id. at 107. 
 79. WIPO Stockholm Records, supra note 69, at 111-12. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Okediji, supra note 71, at 111. 
 82. Id. 
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is construed as a necessary condition that a national copyright 
limitation must successfully pass, and is to be interpreted narrowly. 
The Traditional Interpretation came to prominence in the year 
2000 when it was adopted and formulated in the WTO panel report 
on §110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act.83 In this case, the E.C. 
challenged a provision of the U.S. Copyright Act, which allowed 
bars, stores, and restaurants to play broadcast radio and TV music to 
patrons without the permission of the owners.84   The E.C. argued 
that this provision was inconsistent with the Three-Step Test as 
embodied in Article 13 of TRIPS, and argued that the “objective of 
the TRIPS Agreement is to reduce or eliminate existing exceptions, 
rather than to grant new or extend existing ones.” 85 But the panel 
provided no conclusions regarding the purpose of the TRIPS 
agreement.  The Panel did agree that parties should interpret the three 
steps “cumulatively” as independent, necessary conditions, and 
interpreted each step in a manner that has subsequently been 
described as narrow and restrictive.86 The Panel interpreted the 
“certain special case” clause as requiring exceptions to be “clearly 
defined” 87  (to “guarantee a sufficient degree of legal certainty”88) 
and “narrow” in scope 89 (defined by the number of users to whom 
the exception applies). Copying would conflict with a “normal 
exploitation” of the work, if it potentially could enter into economic 
competition with the ways the owner had traditionally extracted, or 
with “a certain degree of likelihood and probability”90 could in the 
 
 83. See Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 
31-34, WTO Doc. WT/DS160/R (adopted June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Section 
110(5) Panel Report]. 
 84. See id. at 2-3 (noting that the dispute concerned Section 110(5) of the 
Copyright Act which limited exclusive ownership rights by allowing radio and 
television broadcasts of copyrighted materials). 
 85. Id. at 28. 
 86. Id. at 27 (noting that new limitations or exceptions to copyright ownership 
rights can only be made if they satisfy all three conditions of the Three-Step Test). 
 87. See id. at 33 (highlighting that while “certain, special cases” must be 
clearly defined, this does not mean that each and every possible situation must be 
explicitly named but that the scope of the exception is known and particularized). 
 88. Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 83, at 33. 
 89. See id. (arguing that the use of the word “special” means that any 
exceptions or limitations must be narrow in application or exceptional in scope). 
 90. Id. at 48. 
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future extract, “economic value”91 from the work. Finally, such 
copying would “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests” of 
the owner if it had the “potential to cause an unreasonable loss of 
income.”92 Section 1105(B), which enabled businesses under a 
certain square footage to enjoy an exception, failed each of these 
steps. In particular, the Panel did not consider Section 1105(B) 
narrow in scope because 70 percent of all eating and drinking 
establishments, and 45 percent of all retail establishments could 
benefit from the exemption. Accordingly, it deprived copyright 
owners of “a major potential source of revenue.”93 The cumulative 
requirements of clear definition, narrowness in scope, and the 
absence of negative market effect now or sometime in the future 
formed a high burden that the “business exemption” could not 
overcome. 
A number of scholars have applied the “Traditional Interpretation” 
of the Three-Step Test to the question of Fair Use and concluded that 
the doctrine fails to pass the test. Writing in 2000, Okediji found a 
number of challenges to Fair Use under the WTO panel’s 
reasoning.94 First, the requirement that the limitation be well-defined, 
and thus provide a sufficient degree of legal certainty, is problematic 
because the “only certainty involved in construing fair use is 
uncertainty in how a court will ultimately rule.”95 As a vague, 
flexible standard the Fair Use concept is one of the least predictable 
in U.S. law and one of the least predictable exceptions in global 
copyright.96 Second, the Fair Use doctrine may not be a “special 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 59. 
 93. Id. at 54-55. 
 94. See Okediji, supra note 71, at 117 (finding there are “at least three potential 
arguments to support the supposition that the fair use doctrine violates Article 9(2) 
of the Berne Convention and, de facto, Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement”); those 
arguments are the indeterminacy of fair use, the breadth of fair use, and fair use’s 
potential nullification and impairment  of expected benefits. Okediji does note, 
however, that it is unlikely that these arguments would ever result in an 
international challenge to the doctrine. The overall conclusion is that, under the 
more Traditionalist interpretation, the “status of the fair use doctrine under 
international law is, at best, uncertain despite averments to the contrary by the 
United States.” Id. at 87. 
 95. Id. at 118. 
 96. Some scholars have previously criticized the Fair Use doctrine for such 
lack of predictability, see e.g. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG 
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case” in terms of the overall number of copiers it exempts.97 The Fair 
Use doctrine is broad  and exempts a highly heterogeneous set of 
copying, and, unlike other U.S. copyright limits, “is unlimited in the 
scope of users because it is a defense potentially available to every 
defendant in a claim for copyright infringement.”98 Finally, in some 
cases, copying that causes economic competition with the copyright 
owner may still be considered “fair.”99 While negative market effect 
is a strong factor against a finding of fair use, it is not conclusive 
proof of unfairness, and may be outweighed by countervailing 
considerations. 
The fact that the Fair Use doctrine appears to fail the Three-Step 
Test under the “Traditional” Interpretation begs the question: Why 
was the U.S. allowed to join the Berne Union without amending 
§107 of the Copyright Act? Okediji suggests one possibility: that 
other Union members were “willing to accept less than full 
compliance in exchange for the increased importance that U.S. 
accession would bring to the Berne Convention.”100 Nevertheless, 
despite her conclusion that, as a descriptive matter, Fair Use arguably 
fails the Three-Step Test as interpreted by the WTO panel, Okediji 
supports the Fair Use doctrine normatively.101 Unlike others 
analyzing the issue from the Traditional Interpretation, Okediji finds 
the Fair Use doctrine beneficial to the public interest and accordingly 
advocates that international copyright norms ought to be altered to 
permit the limitation.102 
 
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL 
CREATIVITY 187 (2004) (noting that Fair Use is so unpredictable that it is only the 
“right to hire a lawyer”). Other scholars have noticeably reacted against such views 
and pointed out that Fair Use is more predictable than some have previously 
suggested, see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use 
Opinions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense 
of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715 (2011); Matthew Sag, Predicting 
Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012); Samuelson, supra note 51. However, while 
clearly outcomes are to an extent predictable, Fair Use is nevertheless the one of 
the most unpredictable doctrines known to US domestic, or international copyright, 
law. 
 97. See Okediji, supra note 71, at 119. 
 98. Id. at 128. 
 99. Id. at 130. 
 100. Id. at 114-15. 
 101. See id. at 151-72 (providing an argument that international copyright law 
should adopt a form of “international fair use doctrine”). 
 102. Id. 
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2. The Balanced Interpretation 
Reacting in part to the WTO panel report, some scholars propose 
an alternative “Balanced Interpretation” of the Three-Step Test. Two 
primary sources of this interpretation are Martin Senftleben’s 
monograph, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS, AND THE THREE-STEP TEST,103 
and the DECLARATION ON THE BALANCED INTERPRETATION OF THE 
“THREE-STEP TEST” IN COPYRIGHT LAW (the Munich Declaration),104 
prepared by the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and 
Queen Mary’s School of Law, and later signed by 50 intellectual 
property researchers. This interpretation confirms the legitimacy of 
Fair Use.105 
According to the Balanced Interpretation, the purpose of the Berne 
Convention, TRIPS, and other international copyright treaties is not 
merely to increase worldwide copyright protection, but to ensure an 
effective and appropriate “balance of interests” between copyright 
owners and others in society.106 Senftleben’s monograph, and the 
Munich Declaration diverge slightly regarding what normative 
values are to be used in measuring the appropriateness of the 
balance.  Senftleben adopts a deontological normative baseline of 
“intergenerational equality” in which authors are naturally entitled to 
own their creative works so long as ownership leaves “enough and as 
good” in common” for later authors to create.107 The Munich 
Declaration, in contrast, suggests that copyright’s purpose is to 
“benefit the public interest” and hints that an appropriate balance is 
one that maximizes the interests or preferences of all members of 
 
 103. MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS, AND THE THREE-STEP 
TEST (Kluwer 2004) [hereinafter Senftleben]. 
 104. Christophe Geiger, Jonathan Griffiths & Reto Hilty, Towards a Balanced 
Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 30 E.I.P.R. 489 (2008) 
[Hereinafter “Munich Declaration”]. 
 105. Other less restrictive interpretations of the Three-Step Test can be found in, 
e.g. Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The 
Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 28 (2005) (arguing for 
a reverse three-step approach focusing on the effect on the rights holder). 
 106. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 492. 
 107. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 103, at 34-42. In effect, Senftleben adopts a 
Lockean normative theory of copyright. See generally, Wendy Gordon, A Property 
Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533 (1993). 
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society.108 Both sources agree that the Traditional Interpretation does 
not achieve  the “appropriate balance” of interests.109  The Traditional 
Interpretation prevents states from enacting limitations that 
fundamentally undermine incentives to create new works.  
Unfortunately, the restrictive Traditional Interpretation prevents 
states from enacting some limitations, such as Fair Use, to ensure an 
appropriate balance of interests, especially in the current information 
age.110  This new theory therefore “proposes an appropriately 
balanced interpretation of the Three-Step Test under which existing 
exceptions and limitations within domestic law are not unduly 
restricted and the introduction of appropriately balanced exceptions 
and limitations is not precluded.” 111 
The “appropriately balanced” interpretation differs from the 
Traditional Interpretation in two ways.  First, the three steps are not 
read as cumulative or necessary conditions but rather require a 
“comprehensive overall assessment.”112  When assessing whether a 
limitation passes the Three-Step Test, the decision maker must first 
assess how the limitation fairs under each individual step, and then 
weigh the conclusions reached under each step against one another in 
a final analysis.  This allows the decision maker to hold that if the 
limitation passes two of the steps but fails one then, on balance, it 
should potentially be allowed to pass the Three-Step Test’s overall 
 
 108. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 493. 
 109. See SENFTLEBEN, supra note 103, at 81-82 (noting the dualist character of 
the Three-Step Test; designed both to preserve limitations existing at the time of 
the 1967 Stockholm Conference as well as to preserve the author’s right to control 
reproduction of the copyrighted work); Munich Declaration, supra note 119, at 492 
(stating “[t]he Three-Step Test has already established an effective means of 
preventing the excessive application of limitations and exceptions . . . [h]owever, 
there is no complementary mechanism prohibiting an unduly narrow or restrictive 
approach.”). 
 110. See Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 490-91 (arguing that the 
restrictive nature of the traditional approach may hinder policy-makers in 
responding to technological change and make it more difficult to respond to the 
interests of economic competition and creators and performers who might use the 
work). 
 111. Id. at 494. 
 112. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 495 (highlighting that the three 
steps are to be considered together and as a whole). See also Christophe Geiger et 
al, The Three Step Test Revisited: How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in National 
Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 581, 585 (2014) (defending a view that 
the three steps are not separate although they should be considered sequentially). 
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assessment.113  Second, the Balanced Interpretation differs in its 
interpretation of each individual step. The Balanced Interpretation 
disagrees that “certain special cases” require a limitation that should 
call for both a clear definition and a narrow scope.  The Munich 
Declaration interprets the first step as simply requiring that the 
application of the limitation be “reasonably foreseeable.”114  
Senftleben’s analysis adds some more complexity.  In Senftleben’s 
interpretation, the “certainty” term only requires that the limitation 
clearly indicate “some” uses that are privileged,115 and the 
“specialness” requirement is fulfilled if the limitation fulfills some 
“clear reason of public policy” and thus “rests on a rational 
justificatory basis.”116  The Balanced Interpretation also disagrees 
that any actual or potential economic competition in a current or 
reasonably plausible future market conflicts with a normal 
exploitation.117  Rather the Balanced Interpretation finds that defining 
“normal” expectation must take into account competing 
considerations such as the beneficial effect of competition.118 
Similarly, when defining what qualifies as unreasonable prejudice to 
the author’s legitimate interests, the analysis must account for the 
human and fundamental rights of others, as well as the public interest 
in social and scientific progress.119  The divergences between the 
Traditional and Balanced Interpretations are summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF TRADITIONAL AND BALANCED INTERPRETATIONS 
 
 113. See Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 495 (stating that the three steps 
are an “indivisible entirety” to be taken together during assessment of whether a 
limitation passes or fails the tests). 
 114. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 495. 
 115. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 103, at 133-37. 
 116. Id. at 137-38. 
 117. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 490. 
 118. Id. at 495 (stating that limitations and exceptions do not conflict with a 
normal exploitation of protected subject matter if they “are based on important 
competing considerations”). 
 119. Id. (declaring that the Three-Step Test should be interpreted in a manner 
respecting the legitimate interest of third parties including “interests deriving from 
human rights and fundamental freedoms” and “other public interests, notably in 
scientific progress and cultural, social, or economic development”). 
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The Fair Use doctrine passes the Balanced Interpretation of the 
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Three-Step Test.  The Declaration finds that the certain special case 
requirement does not prevent legislatures from introducing “open 
ended limitations” so long as their scope is reasonably foreseeable. 
120  The Declaration states this is of “particular importance in the 
common law world, in which “fair use” and “fair dealing” provisions 
have traditionally functioned as mechanisms of balancing the 
interests” of owners and users, suggesting the U.S. Fair Use doctrine 
passes the reasonable foreseeability test.121  Senftleben concurs that 
the U.S. style Fair Use doctrine is limited to certain special cases.122  
Not only legislatures, but also courts can indicate which uses fall 
within the exception.  The U.S. Fair Use doctrine is sufficiently 
certain, therefore, because over time courts have identified a clear 
group of uses that are privileged.123  Furthermore, regarding the 
“special case” requirement, Senftleben concludes that, because the 
Fair Use doctrine has some underlying policy rationale, it “appears 
not unreasonable to assume that on balance, the fair use doctrine 
meets this qualitative standard.”124  Finally, the argument for Fair 
Use’s legitimacy is strengthened by the Balanced Interpretation’s 
claim that a limitation need not pass every step in order to pass the 
Three-Step Test overall.125  The Fair Use doctrine is a necessary 
doctrinal tool that enables countries to define what qualifies as a 
“normal exploitation” of the work, as well as what the “legitimate 
interests of authors” are, in a world where technological change 
prevents legislatures from setting precise copyright rules far in 
advance.  Therefore, to the extent the doctrine fails the first step, it 
may still pass muster under the Three-Step Test overall. 
Subsequently, a number of countries have relied on the Balanced 
Interpretation to justify their decision to adopt, or propose the 
adoption of, a Fair Use doctrine. The Australian Law Reform 
Commission126 and the Irish Copyright Commission127 both cite to 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 491. 
 122. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 103, at 112. 
 123. Id. at 166 (using U.S. fair use doctrine towards “criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research”). 
 124. Id. at 167. 
 125. See Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 491 (describing the test as 
functioning “as an indivisible entity and that, accordingly, one particular ‘step’ 
cannot function as a ‘showstopper’”). 
 126. Copyright and the Digital Economy, ALRC Report 122, para 4.147. 
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the Declaration and Senftleben’s monograph to support their 
conclusion that Fair Use complies with the Three-Step Test.  The 
new approach also has considerable impact in copyright reform 
debates of other countries, such as the UK.128 
C.  THE CRITIQUE OF THE BALANCED INTERPRETATION 
Advocates of the WTO approach have subsequently criticized the 
Balanced Interpretation.  Supporters of the Traditional Interpretation 
argue the Balanced Interpretation is not an interpretation at all, but a 
reform proposal in disguise.  Former WIPO Assistant Director 
General Mihály Ficsor argues that “[w]hat [the Declaration drafters] 
truly aimed for is not just “correcting” the above-outlined 
consistently followed “traditional” interpretation but rather changing 
the relevant international norms under the guise of a new 
interpretation.”129  Likewise, André Lucas accuses the Declaration 
drafters of concocting an interpretation of the Three-Step Test that is 
not based on treaty language or history, but rather on the “desire to 
legitimize” the U.S. Fair Use Doctrine. 130  This critique can be 
broken down into two parts. 
First, critics argue that the Traditional Interpretation is more 
consistent with the relevant legal sources.131  The Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) requires that treaty parties interpret 
provisions in “accordance with the ordinary meaning,” taking into 
account relevant context and the treaty’s object and purpose. 132  
Arguably the purpose behind the Stockholm Revision Conference 
was to ensure copyright owners a strong level of protection.  As the 
BIRPI preparatory study suggested, the goal was to ensure that “all 
 
 127. COPYRIGHT REVIEW COMM., DEP’T OF JOBS, ENTER., & INNOVATION., 
COPYRIGHT AND INNOVATION: A CONSULTATION PAPER 123 (2012). 
 128. Supra note 11. 
 129. Mihály J. Ficsor, “Munich Declaration” on the Three-Step Test - 
Respectable Objective; Wrong Way to Try to Achieve It 13 (May 11, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.copyrightseesaw.net/archive/?sw_10_item=15. 
 130. André Lucas, For a Reasonable Interpretation of the Three-Step Test, 32 
EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 277, 279 (2010). 
 131. See Ficsor, supra note 129, at 15 (arguing that the Three-Step Test does not 
have appropriate legal foundation). 
 132. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340. 
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forms of exploiting a work” with potential economic significance 
ought to be reserved to the authors, while exceptions to that principle 
were “unacceptable.”133  The “ordinary meaning” of the Three-Step 
Test’s wording seems consistent with that protectionist goal.  By 
requiring that exceptions be limited to “certain special cases, 
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work, and does not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author,” the Three-Step Test created a 
number of necessary, cumulative conditions that a limitation must 
satisfy in order to be legitimate.   Moreover, the few cases in which 
the Test has been interpreted, the most important being the WTO 
panel report, follow the restrictive interpretation.134 
Second, critics argue that the Balanced Interpretation is not really 
a description of the Three-Step Test’s requirements at all, but rather 
is a thinly veiled argument about what the law ought to be.  And 
certainly, this seems a plausible interpretation of the argument, given 
the type of rhetoric and evidence used to defend the Balanced 
Interpretation.  The drafters of the Balanced Interpretation support 
their interpretation, in large part, by appealing to normative value.  
The central contention is that the new interpretation is more 
“appropriately balanced” and, ergo, is a more accurate description of 
what the Three-Step Test really requires.135  The “appropriateness” of 
the values is appraised in the light of intergenerational equality 
(Senftleben) or the maximization of society’s aggregate interests 
(Declaration).136  From this perspective, the Traditional Interpretation 
is “undesirable” 137 and “unduly” 138 narrows the scope of limitations 
that states may enact.139  The Balanced Interpretation then proceeds 
 
 133. Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 83, at 28. 
 134. E.g., Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 83, at 31 (requiring the three 
conditions to “apply on a cumulative basis”). 
 135. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 494 (noting the Declaration’s 
proposal for an “appropriately balanced interpretation of the Three-Step Test” 
under which exceptions and limitations “are not unduly restricted”). 
 136. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 103, at 92-93 (arguing that the use of modern 
technology for reproduction of works should “not be hindered and its adverse 
effects on the interests of authors and beneficiaries of neighboring rights should be 
mitigated by appropriate means of protection”). 
 137. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 494 (describing “certain 
interpretations of the Three-Step Test at international level to be undesirable”). 
 138. Id. at 491. 
 139. Id. 
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from this normative value to propose what sound like changes to the 
dominant Traditional Interpretation.  The Declaration concludes the 
Test “should be interpreted”140 less restrictively in the future and, to 
that end, “proposes an appropriately balanced interpretation of the 
Tree-Step Test.”141  The overt normative judgment, coupled with the 
prescriptive solution, certainly make it sound like the Balanced 
Interpretation is a proposal for changing existing obligations. 
III. THE INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT FOR THE 
BALANCED INTERPRETATION   
Can the Balanced Interpretation’s doctrinal claim be defended in 
light of the traditionalist criticism? Note, the question is not which 
interpretation is simply the most normatively attractive142 nor 
whether the Balanced Interpretation is one of many legitimate 
interpretations, but rather whether, in the light of the traditionalists’ 
arguments, the Balanced Interpretation could nevertheless be seen as 
the correct interpretation of the Three-Step Test?  This Part argues 
that the doctrinal claim could be defended, but to do so requires 
supporters of the interpretation to adopt some version of, what this 
Essay calls, the “Interpretive Argument.” In a nutshell, this argument 
proclaims the Balanced Interpretation the correct legal interpretation 
because it presents the Three-Step Test in its “best light.” Section A 
discusses approaches to international treaty interpretation. Section B 
then develops the Interpretive Argument. 
A. INTERPRETING THE THREE-STEP TEST  
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT create a specific hierarchy of 
considerations to be taken into account when interpreting treaty 
provisions.143 Nevertheless, despite this hierarchy, legal writers have 
 
 140. Id. at 492 (arguing that the Three-Step Test “should be interpreted so as to 
ensure a proper and balanced application of limitations and exceptions”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. In this author’s opinion the Balanced Interpretation is a clearly more 
normatively attractive vision for the Three-Step Test. If the Berne Convention 
were to be rewritten, I would prefer to see this version of the Test incorporated. 
But the question for now is more legalistic: can it be plausibly claimed that the 
Balanced Interpretation is already an accurate understanding of state obligations 
under the Test? 
 143. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31 & art.32, opened for 
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340. 
212 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [33:1 
historically emphasized competing considerations in the interpretive 
process. Very broadly, three schools of treaty interpretation exist: 
textualist, intentionalist, and teleological.144 This Section argues that 
it is difficult to support the formal-doctrinal claims of the Balanced 
Interpretation on the grounds of textualism or intentionalism, but that 
there may be greater support from teleological approaches. 
Textualist approaches emphasize the words of the treaty 
provision.145 This commitment to textualism is found in article 31 
VCLT, which requires that treaty provisions be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the “ordinary meaning” of the terms. The 
approach, is sometimes seen as epitomized in the famous statement 
of Vattell: “the first general maxim of interpretation is that it is not 
permissible to interpret what does not need interpretation.”146 When 
the ordinary meaning of the provision is clear, there is little need to 
search further. 
However, textualism provides little support for the doctrinal 
claims of the Balanced Interpretation. In some cases, the “ordinary 
meaning” of the Three-Step Test is hostile to the Balanced 
Interpretation. In particular, the text’s ordinary meaning fits 
uncomfortably with the claim that the three steps should be read as a 
“comprehensive overall assessment.”147 The provision permits 
copying in “certain special cases, provided that such reproduction 
does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”148 On 
the basis of “ordinary meaning” it is difficult to view the steps as 
anything other than necessary and cumulative conditions. In other 
cases, the text is not hostile to the Balanced Interpretation, but is too 
vague and ambiguous to support the formalist claims made on its 
behalf. For example, the term “certain special cases” is capable of 
 
 144. Francis G. Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With 
Special Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties before the 
Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 18 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 318, 318-320 (1969); IAN 
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 69-76 (1973). 
 145. Jacobs, supra note 144, at 322-323. 
 146. VATTEL, LE DRIOT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE para 
263 (1758) (“la premiere maxime generale sur l’interpretation est, qu’il n’est pas 
permis d’intepreter ce qui n’a pas besoin d’interpretation”). 
 147. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 495. 
 148. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra 
note 13, art. 9. 
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multiple “ordinary meanings.” The “certain special case” 
requirement could be read either as a requirement that all limitations 
be clearly defined and narrow in scope, or more modestly, that 
limitations be confined to some “reasonably foreseeable” instances, 
and in neither case would we contravene any conventional use of 
language.149 In such cases, the Balanced Interpretation’s meaning is 
certainly not ruled out or precluded, but there is not the conclusive 
support required to proclaim it the sole correct interpretation, and the 
Traditional interpretation invalid. To support this bolder claim, one 
must go beyond the text’s ordinary meaning. 
The second well-known approach is intentionalism.150 This school 
emphasizes the actual intentions of the parties. If states are only 
bound by international obligations based on their consent, then it 
would follow that, in order to understand the extent of a state’s 
obligations, one must try to find out what rules the state intended to 
follow. Jurists in this school argue that the travaux préparatoires and 
negotiating history frequently must be consulted to gain insight into 
the will of the contracting states. However, this approach has 
historically adopted a secondary role in international treaty 
interpretation – as evidenced by the fact that the VCLT allows 
recourse to “supplemental means of interpretation” only when the 
interpretation would otherwise be ambiguous, obscure, absurd or 
unreasonable.151 This reflects concerns over some of the theoretical 
problems associated with divining the intent of the parties.152 
Frequently there will be no common intention amongst parties, but 
instead states will each have their own intentions in joining the 
treaty; what intent should govern in such cases? Furthermore, even in 
the case where there is a meeting of the minds, frequently the states 
will not anticipate future developments, making it necessary for 
jurists to try to extrapolate state intent to the new situation. 
Intentionalism does not provide the level of support required to 
support the Balanced Interpretation as a formal-doctrinal matter.  As 
an initial matter, there is some reason to believe that the parties 
“intended” the Three-Step Test as a restrictive provision, as 
 
 149. Senftleben, The International Three-Step Test, supra note 103, at 78. 
 150. Jacobs, supra note 144, at 320-22. 
 151. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32 (1969). 
 152. Jacobs, supra note 144, at 338-39. 
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evidenced by the high-protectionist rhetoric surrounding the Test’s 
introduction. As noted earlier, the BIRPI study proclaimed the reason 
for the Berne revision was the “enlargement of the protection granted 
to authors by the creation of new rights or by the extension of rights 
which are already recognized,”153 and that the “it was obvious that all 
forms of exploiting a work which had, or were likely to acquire, 
considerable economic or practical importance must in principle be 
reserved to the authors.”154  On the question of exceptions, BIPRI 
concluded that “exceptions that might restrict the possibilities open 
to authors in these respects were unacceptable.”155 Begrudgingly, the 
study group admitted that national legislation already contained 
many exceptions and that “it would be vain to suppose that States 
would be ready at this stage to do away with this exceptions to any 
appreciable extent,”156 leaving open the possibility that this 
questionable ideal could be obtained in the future.157 
But even more importantly, it seems unlikely that there was a 
common intent regarding the meaning of the Test’s wording. As 
Martin Senftleben points out, there is a “dualism” inherent in the 
Three-Step Test.158 When the Test was drafted, states adopted a 
highly heterodox array of exceptions. The Three-Step Test was not, 
as acknowledged by BIRPI, intended to hack away at these national 
approaches to copyright scope. The task of the Conference was 
therefore to find a linguistic formula that would have some “bite” 
and prevent excessive limitations to the reproduction right, while 
 
 153. Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 83, at 2-3. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 28.  
 156. Id. at 33.  
 157. Arguably the parties also intended the steps of the Three-Step Test to be 
necessary cumulative conditions. See WIPO Stockholm Records, supra note 69, at 
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that reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work, the next 
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But see Geiger et al, supra 112 (arguing the steps are sequential without 
necessarily being separate). 
 158. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 103, at 81-82. 
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permitting a broad array of traditional national exceptions. Early in 
the drafting process, the parties attempted to define some specific 
permissible exceptions. But the parties could not agree what specific 
uses ought to be exempted. Illustrative is the issue of “private use.” 
Initially “private use” was included as a specifically exempted use, 
but was removed due to party disagreement: Italy preferred a 
“personal use” exemption, while France opted for an “individual or 
family use” formulation.159 After such debates, the UK proposed 
simply to adopt a general, abstract formula, rather than try to 
enumerate specific exceptions. This abstract formula was ultimately 
adopted.160 But in so doing, the parties stripped away much of the 
provision’s meaning. The new provision was sufficiently light on 
substance that it could plausibly cover the great array of different 
national exceptions that existed, and was so lacking in meaning that 
it could not be seriously objectionable to any states’ national 
interests. If history demonstrates anything here, it is that the parties 
intended an ambiguous and vague provision with little concrete rules. 
It is accordingly difficult to divine  more precise meaning for the 
Test’s provisions from party intentions. If meaning is to be found, it 
would need to come from somewhere other than the parties’ 
intentions. 
The final school is the teleological school.161 In the words of 
article 31 VCLT the treaty wording should be interpreted in the 
“light of its object and purpose.”162 Thus ambiguous treaty language 
is to be interpreted in a way that furthers the fundamental reason or 
problem the treaty is meant to address. To a certain extent, this 
inquiry overlaps with the first two schools: the ordinary meaning and 
party intentions often clearly highlight the object and purpose of a 
treaty. However, this is not necessarily the case.163  For some treaties, 
particularly more “organic” or “constitutional” treaties such as the 
UN Charter, the object and purpose may be construed in the light of 
subsequent developments. Some scholars, such as Fitzmaurice, have 
claimed that according to a doctrine of “emergent purpose,” the 
objects and purposes of a treaty are not “fixed and static” but “liable 
 
 159. Id. at 50-51. 
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 161. Jacobs, supra note 144, at 323-25. 
 162. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31 (1969). 
 163. Jacobs, supra note 144, at 319-20. 
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to change” over time.164 The purpose used to guide the interpretation 
are those which  the interpreter views the treaty as achieving at time 
of interpretation, and not necessarily those which existed at the time 
of the treaty’s conclusion. Some have, however, noted this is an 
“extreme” teleological approach.165 
Adopting a teleological lens would undoubtedly provide the 
greatest support for the Balanced Interpretation as a doctrinal matter. 
Not only are there problems with the competing approaches of 
textualism and intentionalism, but the authors of the Balanced 
Interpretation appeal very heavily to the concepts of “appropriate 
balance” and public interest to justify their conclusions.166 However, 
adopting a teleological lens is itself not free from problems. Firstly, 
there is the question of how do we construe the object and purposes 
of the Three-Step Test when those objects and purposes are 
contested? For example, while an appropriate balance of rights and 
obligations to maximize social interests is the purpose favored by the 
Declaration, not too long ago, in the WTO, the European 
Community argued that, at least in TRIPS, the Three Step Test’s 
objective was to “reduce or eliminate existing exceptions, rather than 
to grant new or extend existing ones.”167 Even if we grant that objects 
and purposes may change over time, which conception of objects and 
purposes ought to guide interpretation today? Secondly, what is to be 
done in cases where furthering the objects and purposes attributed to 
a treaty today conflicts with other considerations such as the ordinary 
meaning of the provisions wording, or prior judicial interpretations? 
In order to answer these questions, one needs a more fully fleshed-
out theory of teleological interpretation. 
The strongest support for the Balanced Interpretation arguably 
comes from a teleological approach commonly adopted at the 
domestic level: Legal Interpretivism as developed primarily be 
Ronald Dworkin.168 Strictly speaking, Legal Interpretivism is not a 
 
 164. Id. at 320. 
 165. G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Certain other Treaty Points, 33 B.Y.I.L. 
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 166. See e.g. ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS 
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 167. Supra note 85.  
 168. Dworkin, supra note 26, at 45-87 (1986). 
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theory of interpretation, but a jurisprudential theory on the nature of 
law. Its chief foil is Legal Positivism, particularly as defended by 
HLA Hart.169 Legal Positivism is commonly associated with two 
theses: the social fact thesis and the separability thesis.170 Briefly, the 
first thesis holds that law is a social fact, not a moral fact. That is, 
law is something created by people, not by God, reason, or abstract 
morality. The separability thesis holds that what the law is and what 
the law ought to be are distinct questions. While Positivists disagree 
internally about the connection of law and morality, at the very least 
they agree that in order for a social rule to be “law” it need not 
necessarily align with morality. This stands in contrast to the Natural 
Law tradition which views law, at least partly, as flowing from 
morality, and that social rules in contravention of morality were not 
“law” properly so called (summed up in the Aquinas phrase of lex 
injustia est not lex). Legal Interpretivism is commonly seen as being 
a third jurisprudential school occupying a space between Positivism 
and Natural Law. In contrast to Positivists, Interpretivists claim that 
“law” is not so much a noun, but a verb. That is, law is not a set of 
socially constructed rules, but is an act of interpretation.171 
Understanding what the law on a given issue involves more than a 
search for a set of historical legal materials, but requires the 
interpretation of such materials today in light of contemporary 
values. 
Given Legal Interpretivism views interpretation as the very 
“nature” of law, it has a particularly robust conception of how legal 
interpretation works. To Dworkin, legal interpretation is not merely a 
historical search for certain social facts (e.g. legislation, case 
decisions), but is a partly moral exercise. In contrast to Positivism, 
moral values, even when not explicitly incorporated into legal 
materials, are relevant to legal interpretation. In particular, when 
trying to interpret a source of law (whether that be a case holding, or 
a statutory section etc.), one must take into account the purpose that 
the area of law is meant to serve. Like Fitzmaurice in the 
international arena, “purpose” is understood dynamically by 
 
 169. HLA HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-99 (2012, 3d ed). 
 170. Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV.  1138, 
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 171. And as such, has some connection or overlap with the Legal Process school 
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Dworkin. Rather than being fixed in time, purpose is, to an extent, 
imposed on legal materials.172 The goal of legal interpretation is to 
find the most normatively desirable purpose that an area of law could 
fulfil, and interpret the sources in light of that objective. Thus, legal 
interpretation is a “constructive” or “creative” process.173 The 
creative nature of interpretation, however, does not enable the 
interpreter to interpret a legal rule in whatever way most pleases 
her.174 The interpretation must be an interpretation, rather than 
complete reinvention, of a social practice. The goal of constructive 
interpretation is to find an interpretation which “fits” the existing 
material while simultaneously furthering the most morally attractive 
purposes “justifying” the law.175 The goal is thus to find the 
interpretation which shows the law in its “best light,” or which pro-
actively makes the law the best it possibly can be, given the 
constraints of history.176  
In turn, this theory offers an account of legal interpretation which 
is robust enough to answer the two questions posed earlier to 
teleological approaches. The purpose which should govern an 
interpretation is the most normatively attractive justification. 
Furthermore, certain sources of law (an outlying case for example) 
can be proclaimed as erroneous to the extent they conflict with the 
overall best constructive interpretation. Indeed, these commitments 
enabled Dworkin to defend a formalist theory of adjudication: there 
was, in practically all cases, a best constructive interpretation which 
a court could use to decide a controversy, and thus “right” answers in 
hard cases.177  
 
 172. See Dworkin, supra note 26, at 52 (“Roughly, constructive interpretation is 
a matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best 
possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong.”) 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (“It does not follow, even from that rough account, that an interpreter 
can make of a practice or work of art anything he would have wanted it to be . . . 
For the history or shape of a practice or object constrains the available 
interpretations of it . . . “). 
 175. Id. at 285 (“A successful interpretation must not only fit but also justify the 
practice it interprets”). 
 176. Id. at 90 (stating that theories of law “try to show legal practice as a whole 
in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and 
the best justification of that practice.”). 
 177. For the infamous defense of this view, see Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 
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B. THE “INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT” FOR BALANCE 
While textualism and intentionalism provide little conclusive 
support for the doctrinal claims of the Balanced Interpretation, a 
particularly strong teleological approach, such as that encapsulated 
by Legal Interpretivism, would arguably justify such claims. The 
Balanced Interpretation is far more capable of presenting the Test in 
its “best light” and thus serves as a better constructive interpretation 
than the Traditional Interpretation. This Section therefore sketches 
the type of Interpretive Argument that could be made in favor of the 
Balanced Interpretation before using the argument to respond to 
some of the traditionalist criticisms.  
1. Fit 
A successful constructive interpretation must broadly “fit” the 
existing legal sources.  Our interpretation of the Three-Step Test 
must be largely consistent with the Test’s wording, its context, and 
its purpose, as required by the VCLT.178  However, a constructive 
interpretation “need not fit every aspect” of the wording and 
history.179  To Interpretivists, the “fit” criterion is a “threshold” 
requirement.180 The interpretation must, in other words, “fit enough 
[of the historical legal sources] for the interpreter to be able to see 
himself as interpreting that practice, not inventing a new one.”181 
Accordingly, an interpretation may be inconsistent with some of the 
Three-Step Test’s wording and history and yet still be, overall, the 
right interpretation.  The aim is not to create an interpretation that 
exhibits perfect “vertical consistency” with a chain of historical 
decisions, but an interpretation which is “horizontally consistent” 
with the Test’s history, and the most normatively attractive purpose 
the Test serves today.182 
The Balanced Interpretation, largely, passes the “threshold” of 
fit.183  In particular, the alternative meanings ascribed to each step are 
 
 178. Vienna Convention, supra note 143, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340. 
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not foreclosed.  The requirement that limitations be confined to 
“certain special cases” may, for example, mean the limitation be 
clearly defined and narrow in scope. However, most English 
speakers would agree that it may equally be a requirement of 
“reasonable foreseeability” or that limitations identify “some” 
special cases where the specialness of the case is defined 
teleologically.  Furthermore, the more permissive interpretation of 
each step fits with the context of the Stockholm Revision and the 
desire amongst delegates not to enact a provision which would divest 
states of their traditional approaches to tailoring copyright scope.184  
Certainly, the meanings ascribed by the Balanced Interpretation are 
not consistent with all the relevant legal sources.  The interpretation 
of “certain special cases” as a reasonable foreseeability requirement 
is arguably inconsistent with the WTO Copyright Case and its 
decision that the first step be interpreted as requiring a narrow scope 
as well as reasonable certainty.185  Nevertheless, this aspect of the 
Balanced Interpretation clearly does enough to pass the threshold of 
“fit.”  It fits with enough of the legal sources (especially the ordinary 
meaning of the words and the context) for a future adjudicator to 
consider it a good faith interpretation of the Three-Step Test, rather 
than the pure invention of new norms. 
More difficult is the Balanced Interpretation’s claim that the three 
steps can be interpreted as a “comprehensive overall assessment” and 
not as three necessary and cumulative conditions.186  It is difficult to 
see how this particular aspect of the new theory “fits” with the 
historical legal sources.  This aspect of the interpretation is difficult 
to reconcile with the ordinary meaning of the language, which states 
that limits are lawful in “certain special cases, provided that such 
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work, and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the author.”187  This aspect of the interpretation perhaps fails to meet 
the threshold of fit.188  
 
Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 494. 
 184. See SENFTLEBEN, supra note 103 at 91-92. 
 185. Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 83, at 11. 
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2. Justification   
The next question is which interpretation best “justifies” the Three 
Step Test?  Which interpretation of the Test is consistent with the 
most normatively attractive justification for international copyright 
regulation?  The answer is: the Balanced Interpretation. 
The Traditional Interpretation views the purpose of international 
copyright law as increasing worldwide copyright standards to the 
highest feasible level and the Three-Step Test as safeguarding that 
strong copyright protection.189  This is undeniably the purpose that 
many international copyright lawyers intended modern international 
copyright law to serve .190  However, to Interpretivists, the right 
interpretation is not necessarily that which is consistent with the 
historically intended purposes for international copyright law, but 
rather that which furthers the most normatively defensible ones.191 
This traditionalist justification for international copyright 
regulation is not normatively attractive.  If international copyright 
law tries to achieve the highest feasible level of protection, bad 
consequences will likely follow.  Copyright protection benefits some 
individuals in society. The Copyright owners are enabled to charge a 
fee from those who would use the work, which not only is in their 
interest but also in the interest of consumers who enjoy the new 
works that are created as a result.  However, copyright protection 
also negatively affects the interests of others. Those who wish to use 
the work in the future are required to pay higher fees for doing so, 
thus preventing socially valuable uses (e.g., parody, news reporting, 
research etc.), and discouraging follow-on creators from creating 
new works in the future.192  Assuming that all interests are of equal 
importance, copyright protection ought to ensure the maximization 
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of these different interests.  Unilaterally increasing copyright 
standards without taking into account these other interests will likely 
lead to a sub-optimal situation where society’s aggregate interests are 
negatively affected.193 
Appealing to natural rights cannot justify such a copyright-
maximum stance.  On some accounts, authors are naturally entitled 
to control the use of their works.194  Others in society, however, 
equally enjoy natural rights.195  Those who build on prior works are 
as much authors who deserve the products of their creative labor, and 
who ought to have the autonomy to engage in culture as prior 
generations’ creators.196  Even from a natural rights perspective, there 
must be some way of reconciling the natural rights of authors, and 
the equally important rights of others in society.197  Whatever way 
one looks at the problem, therefore, the idea that international 
copyright law must provide the highest level of protection to owners 
without considering the desires of others in society is not defensible. 
The Balanced Interpretation presents a far more normatively 
attractive vision of international copyright regulation.  On the 
domestic level, the dominant justification for copyright protection is 
that such regulation is in society’s best interest.  As noted above, 
copyright protection not only enables copyright owners to satisfy 
their interest in controlling the use of, and gaining revenue from the 
use of the work, but also benefits others in society who enjoy the 
new works. However, this does not negate the fact that copyright 
protection also costs those who otherwise could use the work freely, 
and the legal system which must enforce copyright standards.  The 
dominant economic-utilitarian belief is that copyright ought to 
maximize society’s interests (or preferences).  It is likely that 
society’s interests will be maximized if domestic copyright provides 
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enough reward to copyright owners to induce creation.198  Any 
protection above and beyond that which is necessary to bring forth 
the work creates the aforementioned costs without any of the 
benefits.  Some international copyright standards aid this purpose.199  
If copyright owners cannot derive financial reward from foreign 
markets, it is likely that their creative incentives would be 
suboptimal, and the interests of the national society would be 
minimized.  By agreeing on some worldwide minimum standards of 
copyright protection, states can ensure their authors are adequately 
compensated and thus the interests of states are enhanced.200  But, 
those minimum standards must not damage the fundamental purpose 
copyright serves: maximizing the interests of society.  If minimum 
standards are high enough to prevent socially valuable uses and 
future creation, then the regulation has undercut the very purpose it 
ought to serve.  For this reason, international copyright law must 
bring about the “appropriate balance” of rights and obligations.  It 
must ensure authors receive adequate financial incentive to create, 
but not go beyond that point. 
The Balanced Interpretation more effectively achieves this 
purpose than the Traditional Interpretation.  In particular, the 
Traditional Interpretation of the Three-Step Test prevents states from 
limiting copyright protection when doing so is necessary to 
maximize society’s interests.  The Traditional Interpretation of the 
first step (“certain special cases”), which  requires limitations to be 
both “clearly defined” and “narrow in scope,” threatens the ability of 
states to enact open-ended limitations necessary for calibrating 
copyright in the Information Age.201  As explained in Part I, states 
increasingly need a flexible, open-ended doctrinal limitations that 
will allow courts to exempt new uses of copyrighted material from 
licensing requirements as they arise.202  To the extent that the 
Traditional Interpretation casts doubt on such exceptions, it threatens 
to prevent states from achieving the appropriate, interest-maximizing 
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balance.  On the other hand, the “reasonable foreseeability” approach 
suggested by the Declaration, achieves this goal.203  Under this 
approach, the scope of limitations must be foreseeable but only 
“reasonably” so.204  The “reasonableness” assessment takes into 
account both the value of predictability and the value of flexibility 
such that open-ended limitations are helpful in achieving the right 
balance.205 
Likewise, the Balanced Interpretation’s approach to steps two and 
three is more likely to achieve the appropriate balance of interests 
than the Traditional Interpretation.  The second step requirement that 
limitations not conflict with a “normal exploitation” of the work has 
traditionally prevented states from enacting limits which would 
create any actual or potential, present or future, economic 
competition with the copyright holder.206  This has the negative effect 
of preventing limitations that create any competition with the 
copyright holder.207  However, some competition is clearly desirable 
and necessary to ensure the copyright owner does not enjoy an 
unrestrained monopoly.  If a state wishes to balance the interests of 
creators and users, copyright must enable some competition, 
providing that competition does not undercut creative incentives.208  
The Traditional Interpretation prevents states from striking this 
balance by restricting all competition with the copyright owner.  By 
contrast, the Balanced Interpretation’s requirement that competition 
is only unlawful when it is unreasonable permits competition when 
there is no clear reason to believe that such exceptions and 
limitations undercut creative incentives.  For example, copying 
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legitimately acquired works for purely private uses209 – e.g., creating 
back-up copies of works, or moving digital files from a computer to 
a smart phone – is unlikely to have a meaningful effect on creative 
incentives,210 and thus would not create “unreasonable economic 
competition.211”  Similarly, under the third step requirement that 
limitations not cause “unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests,” 
the Balanced Interpretation explicitly calls for third party interests to 
be taken into account when deciding what is unreasonable.212  
Accordingly, the Balanced Interpretation is more likely to facilitate 
limitations which, when all social interests are taken into account, 
achieves the right balance. 
Finally, while the “comprehensive overall assessment” 
requirement is of dubious “fit,”213 it is important to note that this 
requirement would nevertheless help achieve the right balance of 
interests.  Currently, each step highlights a factor, such as legal 
certainty or normal expectations, which law makers must take into 
account when assessing whether a limitation furthers the public 
interest or not.  However, while a proper assessment of the public 
interest cannot be complete without assessing the limitation’s effects 
on these criteria, it does not follow that a limitation must pass each 
step to be in the public interest.  It is highly possible that a limitation 
fails to pass one step, and yet overall, still may be in the public 
interest.  The clearest example of such a case is the Fair Use 
doctrine.  The lack of legal certainty provided by such doctrines is a 
factor against finding a limitation to be in the society’s interest, but 
nevertheless the doctrine may ensure a balance of interests conducive 
to the public interest because of the strong benefit it provides to 
 
 209. See generally Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. 
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countries trying to define the “legitimate interests” of authors in the 
twenty-first century.  As a result, the Balanced Interpretation 
construes the interrelationship between the steps in a way that allows 
the “public interest” value to be the most important criterion in 
assessing a limitation, to which the steps are crucial guides but not 
themselves the ultimate arbiters.  
3. Summary 
In summary, while textualist and intentionalist Interpretivist 
approaches do not yield enough support to proclaim the Balanced 
Interpretation the right interpretation of the Three-Step Test, a 
particularly strong teleological approach, such as the one adopted by 
Legal Interpretivists on the domestic level, would support such 
doctrinal claims. The Balanced Interpretation broadly fits enough of 
the legal sources to be an interpretation, rather than mere reinvention, 
of the Test, while promoting an appropriate balance of interests 
conducive to maximizing society’s interests. To those inclined to 
adopt the teleological Interpretive Argument, this enables a response 
to some of the traditionalist criticisms. 
Firstly, traditionalists argue that the Balanced Interpretation is not 
a faithful interpretation at all, but is in fact a normative reform 
proposal in disguise.214 To which, the response of supporters of the 
Balanced Interpretation adopting the Interpretivist Argument should 
be that theirs is not a re-imagining of the Test, but is a reconstruction 
of the Test in light of the most normatively attractive justifications 
for international copyright law today. The appeal to normative value 
is not a barefaced attempt to change international legal norms, but is 
justified on the plausible grounds that normatively attractive 
purposes are internal to the interpretive process. In effect, the 
response must be that the traditionalists adopt a thin and 
unpersuasive vision of international legal interpretation. 
Second, while traditionalists argue that the WTO approach is 
conclusive,215 supporters of the Balanced Interpretation can claim 
that the WTO panel erred in their interpretation of the Three Step 
Test. The Interpretation which we, potentially, should follow is that 
which gives effect to the normatively defensible objects and 
 
 214. Supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text. 
 215. Supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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purposes of international copyright law, and thus shows the Test in 
its best light. The WTO approach arguably fails that standard and 
thus is not consistent with the best constructive interpretation. 
Finally, not only does the Interpretive Argument provide some 
potential ammunition to those supporting the Balanced Interpretation 
as a doctrinal matter, arguably Legal Interpretivism is already, albeit 
implicitly, the jurisprudential and methodological approach they 
adopt. Ronald Dworkin famously described how lawyers adopt an 
“Interpretive Attitude” towards legal sources, and this explained how 
legal interpretations evolved over time. This evolution comes in three 
stages.216  First, at a “pre-interpretive stage” lawyers identify the 
“tentative content” of the relevant rule.217  Second is an “interpretive 
stage” wherein “the interpreter settles on some general justification 
for the main elements of the practice identified at the pre-interpretive 
stage.”218  At this stage, interpreters “impose meaning on the 
institution” and crucially ask not for the historical justification but 
the most normatively defensible justification.  And finally is a “post-
interpretive or reforming stage” wherein the interpreter “adjusts his 
sense of what the practice “really” requires so as better to serve the 
justification he accepts at the interpretive stage.”219  
Arguably, in the last twenty years, the Interpretive Attitude has 
taken hold in international copyright. In 2000, at a  
pre-interpretive stage, international copyright lawyers tentatively 
interpreted the Three-Step Test in a restrictive and protectionist 
manner. But the occurrence of an “interpretive stage” in the twenty-
first century lead international copyright lawyers to a different 
justification for international copyright law: harmonizing the balance 
of rights and obligations in a way that roughly maximize society’s 
interests.  The revised interpretations of the Three-Step Test are the 
product of the “post-interpretive or reforming stage” and attempt to 
bring the rule into conformity with this more attractive purpose.  
 
IV. CHALLENGES AND ALTERNATIVE 
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ARGUMENTS  
This Essay articulates the Interpretivist Argument in favor of a 
more balanced interpretation of the Three-Step Test.  While textualist 
and intentionalist approaches to treaty interpret fail to provide 
support for the Balanced Interpretation’s formal-doctrinal claim, a 
rather strongly teleological approach, such as that found domestically 
in the theory of Legal Interpretivism, would support such 
conclusions. However, this Interpretive Argument is vulnerable to 
attack. This Part briefly considers theoretical objections to the 
Interpretive Argument. Should the Interpretive Argument fail, then 
presumably the Balanced Interpretation’s doctrinal claim also fails. 
This Part therefore also considers alternative arguments (the 
Normative Argument and the Discretion Argument) that could be 
made in favor of the Balanced Interpretation, while highlighting the 
problems associated with those arguments. 
One may dispute the grounds on which the Interpretivist argument 
rests.  One may argue that normative value is never relevant to 
interpreting international copyright provisions, or alternatively, that 
it is only relevant when that normative value has been clearly agreed 
upon and incorporated into law (through, for example, treaty 
ratification).  This line of criticism is particularly important because 
very few scholars have proposed or defended Interpretivist accounts 
of international law, let alone international copyright law. In part, 
this is likely because Interpretivism’s chief proponent, Ronald 
Dworkin, was primarily concerned with explaining the attributes of 
law in a single political community and, furthermore, concentrated 
his attention on Anglo-American common law systems.220  It is 
possible, therefore, to argue that, in the absence of a serious defense 
of Interpretivism at the international level, we must assume the 
Positivist theories are more accurate and thus moral value plays a 
very limited role in interpreting international legal sources. 
This criticism is, however, unpersuasive.  Fundamentally, 
Interpretivism is a conceptual theory of the nature of law.  It applies 
to all law, whether that be domestic or international.  Accordingly, 
scholars are now starting to develop Interpretivist accounts of 
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international law.  Basak Cali, has argued effectively that 
Interpretivism is relevant to the theoretical and normative debates 
about international law.221  Meanwhile, John Tasioulas supports  an 
Interpretivist theory of customary international law, in which he 
argues that the “ethical appeal of a candidate norm figures among the 
criteria for determining whether it is a valid norm of CIL [Customary 
International Law].”222 And, in a posthumously published essay, 
Ronald Dworkin argued for a partially moralized conception of 
international law, in which states have a moral duty to accept 
constraints on their sovereignty that would enhance their political 
legitimacy.223   
Nevertheless, if one disagrees with the Interpretive Argument, two 
alternative lines of argument are open to those who favor a more 
permissive Three-Step Test.  First is the “Normative Argument.” 
This is, in effect, to concede that the Balanced Interpretation is not an 
accurate description of the law and to argue that international law 
norms ought to be changed.  This argument benefits from the role of 
state practice as a source of international law.  Arguably, the process 
of changing the Three-Step Test would not require action as drastic 
as a treaty modification.  Instead, states could simply adopt and 
practice a more permissive interpretation of the Test with the hope 
that over time the volume of state practice would alter existing legal 
norms.  
Second is the “Discretion” Argument.  This argument involves 
accepting that the Three-Step Test has very little settled meaning.  
Rather, this argument views the wording of the Three-Step Test as 
ambiguous in large part because its drafters did not want to fully 
decide the issue of what exceptions and limitations are permissible, 
but instead kicked the can down the road, allowing states to figure 
the issue out on a more case-by-case basis.  Following this line of 
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reasoning, both the Traditional and Balanced Interpretations are 
legitimate, plausible, interpretations not ruled out by the Three-Step 
Test.  Judges and policymakers thus have discretion to adopt 
whichever interpretation they prefer.  The weakness of this argument 
is that it gives up on the formalist reasoning that the Balanced 
Interpretation typically adopts.  No longer could supporters of the 
Balanced Interpretation claim that the WTO panel somehow made a 
legal error.  The most supporters could claim is the WTO panel made 
a different policy judgment, which it had discretion to do.  Thus, it is 
only the Interpretive Argument which supports the strongest claims 
made by advocates of the Balanced Interpretation  
V. CONCLUSION  
The interpretation of the Three-Step Test is one of the most hotly 
contested issues in international economic regulation.  This Essay 
analyzed the doctrinal claim made by the Balanced Interpretation 
(i.e. that the Balanced Interpretation is the correct legal interpretation 
of the Three-Step Test) and asked whether it can be defended.  It 
argued that such a claim could not be supported by two main 
approaches to treaty interpretation – textualism and intentionalism – 
but may be supported if one adopts a particularly strong teleological 
approach to interpretation, such as that developed by Ronald 
Dworkin and Legal Interpretivists on the domestic level.  
